Commit graph

3 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Ashwin Kumar Sivakumar
fdd5c7a418 Fix security audit findings: admin authz, captcha, secret leak, CORS
All checks were successful
build-and-release / build (developers) (push) Successful in 5m31s
build-and-release / build (catering-services) (push) Successful in 5m56s
build-and-release / build (employees) (push) Successful in 6m23s
build-and-release / build (companies) (push) Successful in 6m31s
build-and-release / build (cron) (push) Successful in 6m38s
build-and-release / build (customers) (push) Successful in 7m19s
build-and-release / build (gateway) (push) Successful in 1m28s
build-and-release / build (fitness-trainers) (push) Successful in 2m2s
build-and-release / build (jobs) (push) Successful in 1m12s
build-and-release / build (graphic-designers) (push) Successful in 2m20s
build-and-release / build (job-seekers) (push) Successful in 2m24s
build-and-release / build (photographers) (push) Successful in 2m20s
build-and-release / build (makeup-artists) (push) Successful in 2m55s
build-and-release / build (tutors) (push) Successful in 2m15s
build-and-release / build (payments) (push) Successful in 3m48s
build-and-release / build (ugc-content-creators) (push) Successful in 2m35s
build-and-release / build (social-media-managers) (push) Successful in 4m46s
build-and-release / build (video-editors) (push) Successful in 2m41s
build-and-release / build (users) (push) Successful in 8m7s
- Require admin role on role/module/permission management endpoints
  that previously accepted any authenticated user (privilege escalation)
- Add server-side captcha generation/verification (Redis-backed,
  single-use, 5 min TTL) enforced on register/login for users and
  employees services
- Untrack .env.test111 (contained a live SMTP key) and harden
  .gitignore against future .env commits
- Stop logging OTP codes in plaintext
- Restrict jobs service CORS to an explicit origin allowlist
- Mask PayU merchant secret/salt in payment-gateway-config responses,
  preserving the stored value on save when the field is left unchanged
- Bump vulnerable transitive dependencies (quinn-proto, rustls-webpki,
  anyhow) via cargo update; switch aws-sdk-s3 off the legacy rustls
  feature

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 17:31:48 +05:30
Ashwin Kumar
e16d28a405 fix: track Cargo.lock (required for reproducible Docker builds) 2026-04-09 02:09:11 +02:00
Ashwin Kumar
bb8155dd27 feat: add Redis for OTP, auth tokens, rate limiting, lead dedup and marketplace cache
- Add crates/cache with client, otp, rate_limit, token, lead, jobs modules
- OTP tokens stored in Redis (15-min TTL, single-use GETDEL on verify)
- Refresh tokens stored in Redis (30-day TTL) — removed DB storage
- Password reset tokens stored in Redis (1-hour TTL, single-use)
- Rate limiting: register (10/hr), login (10/15min), OTP resend (3/hr), lead (5/hr), job post (20/hr)
- Lead request deduplication: 24-hour Redis lock per professional+requirement pair
- Marketplace listings cached in Redis (5-min TTL per profession+page+limit)
- Add ProfessionState{pool, redis} to contracts crate, replacing bare PgPool in all 9 profession apps
- All profession handlers and main.rs updated to use ProfessionState
- REDIS_URL env var (default: redis://127.0.0.1:6379) used across all services
- Fix profession model struct name mangling in 6 handlers (MakeupArtistRepository etc.)
- Add custom_data JSONB migration for all 9 profession profile tables
- Add onboarding_state model and repository (save_progress, complete, is_complete)
- Add onboarding handler accepting roleKey:String (not role_id:UUID) for frontend compat

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-18 22:58:42 +01:00