From 01f3810c8f2ebfda0cc8d9bb7cf3b0d1d7ed3f98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ashwin Kumar Sivakumar <ashwin@traceworks.in>
Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2026 23:28:39 +0530
Subject: [PATCH] feat(employees): add forgot-password/reset-password for admin
 accounts
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Employees (internal admin/staff) had no self-service password reset —
only /login, /logout, /session existed. Adds /api/admin/auth/forgot-password
and /api/admin/auth/reset-password, mirroring the existing users-table flow
but against EmployeeRepository and a distinct Redis key namespace
(reset:employee:*) so a code for one identity store can never be consumed
against the other.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---
 apps/employees/src/handlers/auth.rs | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 crates/cache/src/token.rs           | 22 ++++++++
 2 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/apps/employees/src/handlers/auth.rs b/apps/employees/src/handlers/auth.rs
index 3d8872e..20e0791 100644
--- a/apps/employees/src/handlers/auth.rs
+++ b/apps/employees/src/handlers/auth.rs
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 use auth::{
-    crypto::{verify_password},
+    crypto::{hash_password, verify_password},
     jwt::generate_tokens,
 };
 use axum::{
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ pub fn router() -> Router<AppState> {
         .route("/login",           post(login))
         .route("/logout",          post(logout))
         .route("/session",         get(session))
+        .route("/forgot-password", post(forgot_password))
+        .route("/reset-password",  post(reset_password))
 }
 
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -131,3 +133,77 @@ async fn session(
         "role_code": auth.claims.active_role,
     })))
 }
+
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
+pub struct ForgotPasswordPayload {
+    pub email: String,
+}
+
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
+pub struct ResetPasswordPayload {
+    pub code: String,
+    pub new_password: String,
+}
+
+/// POST /api/admin/auth/forgot-password
+/// Always responds 200 regardless of whether the email exists, to avoid
+/// leaking which addresses have employee accounts.
+async fn forgot_password(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    Json(payload): Json<ForgotPasswordPayload>,
+) -> Result<impl IntoResponse, (StatusCode, Json<ErrorResponse>)> {
+    let silent_ok = (StatusCode::OK, Json(serde_json::json!({ "message": "Reset code sent if email exists" })));
+    let email = payload.email.to_lowercase();
+
+    let mut redis = state.redis.clone();
+    if !cache::rate_limit::check(&mut redis, "employee_forgot_password", &email, 3, 900).await.unwrap_or(true) {
+        return Ok(silent_ok);
+    }
+
+    let employee = match EmployeeRepository::get_by_email(&state.pool, &email).await {
+        Ok(Some(e)) => e,
+        _ => return Ok(silent_ok),
+    };
+
+    let code = format!("{:06}", rand::random::<u32>() % 1_000_000);
+    tracing::info!(otp = %code, email = %employee.email, "OTP generated for employee password reset");
+
+    cache::token::store_employee_reset(&mut redis, &code, &employee.id.to_string())
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| err(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, &e.to_string(), "CACHE_ERROR"))?;
+
+    let name = format!("{} {}", employee.first_name, employee.last_name);
+    let _ = state.mail.send_password_reset_email(&employee.email, &name, &code).await;
+
+    Ok(silent_ok)
+}
+
+/// POST /api/admin/auth/reset-password
+async fn reset_password(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    Json(payload): Json<ResetPasswordPayload>,
+) -> Result<impl IntoResponse, (StatusCode, Json<ErrorResponse>)> {
+    let mut redis = state.redis.clone();
+
+    let employee_id_str = cache::token::consume_employee_reset(&mut redis, &payload.code)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|_| err(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, "Cache error", "CACHE_ERROR"))?
+        .ok_or_else(|| err(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "Invalid or expired reset code", "INVALID_CODE"))?;
+
+    let employee_id = employee_id_str
+        .parse::<uuid::Uuid>()
+        .map_err(|_| err(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "Invalid reset code", "INVALID_CODE"))?;
+
+    if payload.new_password.len() < 8 {
+        return Err(err(StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY, "Password must be at least 8 characters", "VALIDATION_ERROR"));
+    }
+
+    let password_hash = hash_password(&payload.new_password)
+        .map_err(|e| err(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, &e.to_string(), "INTERNAL_ERROR"))?;
+
+    EmployeeRepository::change_password(&state.pool, employee_id, &password_hash)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| err(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, &e.to_string(), "DB_ERROR"))?;
+
+    Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(serde_json::json!({ "message": "Password reset successfully" }))))
+}
diff --git a/crates/cache/src/token.rs b/crates/cache/src/token.rs
index 0cc17c3..4d597bd 100644
--- a/crates/cache/src/token.rs
+++ b/crates/cache/src/token.rs
@@ -65,3 +65,25 @@ pub async fn consume_reset(
     let key = format!("reset:{token}");
     redis.get_del(key).await
 }
+
+// ── Employee (internal admin) password-reset tokens ──────────────────────────
+// Distinct key namespace from the user-facing reset tokens above, so a code
+// generated for one identity store can never be consumed against the other.
+
+pub async fn store_employee_reset(
+    redis: &mut RedisPool,
+    token: &str,
+    employee_id: &str,
+) -> Result<(), redis::RedisError> {
+    let key = format!("reset:employee:{token}");
+    redis.set_ex(key, employee_id, RESET_TTL).await
+}
+
+/// Atomically fetch and delete the employee reset token (single-use).
+pub async fn consume_employee_reset(
+    redis: &mut RedisPool,
+    token: &str,
+) -> Result<Option<String>, redis::RedisError> {
+    let key = format!("reset:employee:{token}");
+    redis.get_del(key).await
+}